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By Captain Jeffrey Kline, USN (Ret.)
Seventy five years ago, Ensign “Dagwood” Propst sat in the pilot seat of his large PBY search
plane waiting to takeoff from Midway.He and his crew were about to embark on a night
mission they had never conducted, to employ a weapon they had never used, against an
enemy they had never met.
On June 3, 1942 the four Japanese carrier groups had not yet been located and the famous
engagements to occur the following day were still in the future for both American and
Japanese forces.But reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Midway had located Admiral
Tanaka’s transport forces approaching from the east and the island’s defenders were keen on
attacking where they could.
Ensign Propst’s Catalina was number three in a flight of four radar-equipped PBYs taking off
from Midway to conduct a night torpedo attack against the Japanese transport group –
unsuccessfully attacked earlier that day by Midway’s B-17s.The idea to strap torpedoes to the
wings of these large slow search aircraft and conduct a night attack had been thought up that
afternoon, and the least tired crews of the VP-44 air reconnaissance squadron had been
selected to fly them.They had been briefed, discussed tactics, and were ready to take the
action to an enemy that had attacked Pearl Harbor only six months earlier.
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Lead by Lieutenant Red Richards, the flight of these large, slow PBYs-turned torpedo attack
planes were airborne at 2115 and winging toward their target.After navigating through bad
weather one PBY lost contact with the others and after an unsuccessful search for the enemy
returned to Midway.As told by Gordan Prange in his book Miracle at Midway, the three
remaining PBYs broke into clear weather just as they neared Tanaka’s ships.Although not
coordinated, all three made attack runs. Ensign Propst targeted the largest silhouette, swung in
a wide spiral to mask his approach by flying into the moon’s path, lowered his aircraft to 50 feet
altitude, and dropped his weapon.His attack resulted in the first and only American air dropped
torpedo hit in the entire Battle of Midway. Ensign Propst’s hit on the oiler Akebone Maru killed
or wounded 23 men and was the first blood drawn in the entire battle.
Was this night attack a foolhardy and reckless plan blessed by luck, or a high-risk venture
informed by a sound plan, good knowledge of aircraft and weapon capabilities, and a
motivated air crew?
In his “Lessons from the Battle of Midway,” Victor Davis Hanson observes“…American
commanders were far more open to improvising and risk-taking than their Japanese
counterparts.”But more than just the commanders, the mid-grade and junior officers combined
technical competency, innovative thought, and bold initiative to do such things as strap a
torpedo on the wings of a PBY, develop the “Thach weave” to overcome fighter short comings,
and gleam information from  Japanese communications.
The Thach weave was a two-aircraft tactic to counter the Zero’s superior maneuvering
capabilities.Conceived months early by John Thach using match sticks as a simulation and
then tested in mock combat with Ensign Edward Butch O’Hare, the namesake of O’Hare
Airport, the Thach weave was first employed by John Thach himself while in combat on 4
June.Used again in Guadalcanal, it became a standard U.S. fighter tactic.
And, as every intelligence officer knows,Commander Joseph Rochefort, Chief of the Combat
Intelligence Office on Hawaii, lead innovative efforts to derive Japanese Midway attack
intentions that led to Nimitz positioning Task Force 16 and Task Force 17 northeast of
Midway.What is not universally appreciated is that his assessments were frequently
challenged by his intelligence chain of command, particularly in Washington D.C.
In each of these examples, relatively junior officers were put in unfamiliar crisis situations
which demanded action on their part.Using their technical knowledge, innovative approaches,
and courage they found sound, bold courses of action. This is the tie to the Naval
Postgraduate School today.As an institution we keep that spirit alive by providing technical
know-how, in context of operational and tactical situations, and challenge our students to
produce innovative solutions to real world problems.From exploring concepts of swarming
unmanned aerial vehicles to smart warheads on torpedoes, we advance graduate and
professional education synergistically.That is our niche, that is our uniqueness, and that is our
contribution to the nation’s future security.
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The importance of continuing to educate officers in preparation for a future conflict was not lost
on Chester Nimitz, even before World War II started.As told in one of our Dudley Knox Special
Collection papers authored by John Sanders, Admiral Nimitz wrote a letter in 1965 stating
“When I became Chief of Bureau of Navigation in June 1939—my first act was to send for the
BuNav War Plans.To my horror—I learned that on “D” day—it was planned to close down the
Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School in order to provide officers for an
expanding Fleet—as was done on ‘D’ day for World War I…..I immediately cancelled those
plans and prepared for expanded classes at both the War College and Postgraduate
School.”In fact, after 1941 the postgraduate school’s student population increased threefold.By
war’s end, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King was already ordering surveys for a west
coast NPS site to accommodate the school’s future growth.And, in 1951 the school moved to
its new location in the Hotel Del Monte in Monterey which had served well as an aviation
training location during the war.
In addition to Nimitz and King, Admiral Arleigh Burke recognized the importance and
uniqueness of the Naval Postgraduate School when, in a NPS commencement address, he
said recognized the foresightof NPS founders by saying “They recognized that ships and naval
weapons were becoming more complex, that their proper employment at sea would require
officers who were familiar not only with the age old profession of the sea, but who could
understand and could use effectively the complex weapons of the years to come.”
And today, are we meeting the expectations of Nimitz, King, and Burke?In their time the stuff of
lasers, robotics, and 3-D printers was science fiction.Today, our graduates who studied how to
apply these technologies at NPS are in the fleet.Graduates like CDR Chad Kaiser, when as a
student and Lieutenant, modeled and simulated the real threat of an unmanned aerial
swarming attack against our destroyers, coming up withthe best way to use our combat
systems to defend against it. His work was sent to the fleet as a tactical bulletin. Or now
Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey Kee, who, using insight in potential adversaries locating and
targeting methods, suggested ways for our ships to maneuver to increase the enemy’s
uncertainty in targeting–or recently retired, Admiral McRaven, whose NPS thesis became
doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.There are many examples, such as work in bi-static
acoustic operations, adaptive optics, distributed and integrated logistics, cyber operations,
attacker-defender optimization, unmanned systems, force design, and energy research.
To summarize with a quote from William Lind in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook :
“The process that is tactics includes the art of selecting from among your techniques those
which create that unique approach for the enemy, time, and place.Education is the basis for
doing that – education not in what to do, but in how to think.”
At NPS we teach officers how to think about employing technology in situations they have not
thought about before.We rarely know the answers, as it is a journey of discovery for both
officers and faculty.But I do know this, our graduates are prepared to face unanticipated
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conflict situations, and then apply their technical and tactical talents to generate and apply
innovative ways to meet our country’s future challenges. That is what makes the Naval
Postgraduate School a most unique educational institution in our country.
A retired naval officer with 26 years of service, Jeff is currently a Professor of Practice in the
Operations Research department and holds the Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis. He
teaches Joint Campaign Analysis, executive risk assessment and coordinates maritime
security education programs offered at NPS. Jeff supports applied analytical research in
maritime operations and security, theater ballistic missile defense, and future force composition
studies. He has served on several Naval Study Board Committees. His NPS faculty awards
include the Superior Civilian Service Medal, 2011 Institute for Operations Research and
Management Science (INFORMS) Award for Teaching of OR Practice, 2009 American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Homeland Security Award, 2007 Hamming Award for
interdisciplinary research, 2007 Wayne E. Meyers Award for Excellence in Systems
Engineering Research, and the 2005 Northrop Grumman Award for Excellence in Systems
Engineering. He is a member of the Military Operations Research Society and the Institute for
Operations Research and Management Science.  
Featured Image: U.S. Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers of VS-8 from USS Hornet
about to attack the burning Japanese cruiser Mikuma for the third time on 6 June 1942
(Wikimedia)
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